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Talk:Soren Kierkegaard/@comment-3338975-20120720213510
When reading Kierkegaard's triparite theory of the stages of human life and arriving at the point of his discussion of religious faith, one has to remember he was working within the context of Hegelianism, which said everything in reality could be explained in terms of dialectical thought. What he was trying to emphasize by doing that, was that the Abrahamic monothest's conception of God lies outside of the dialectic (and thus explanation), and thus religious faith can't be explained as a step of the dialectic directly. It seems that Kierkegaard thinks that the stage of religious faith is the existence of dialectical thought about the ethical and aesthetic stages with a person's mind. This is the probable reason behind the disjunction between the first two steps, the moving from observing the two sides of the tool (the dialetical operation of synthesizing opposites) to the observation of one's own experience of using the tool itself obviously warranting such a difference. I believe that the necessity of taking a leap of faith when it comes to the possibility of a suspension of ethics for a beyond-ethical telos ''can be rationally accepted by both believers and skeptics of the intellectual variety, though not without the amendment I will explain below. The case for the immorality of belief without sufficient evidence can easily be made by establishing practical reasoning why this is so (as was famously done by William K. Clifford, to which I owe the views which directly connect to this concept), but traditionally this overlooks the necessity of providing sufficient evidence that the ethical cannot be consciously overridden for something higher than itself. Kierkegaard presents his case for faith by flaunting that very necessity, but fails to bring up the very real possibility of doubts existing alongside this paradoxical faith. This view is possible and reasonably should be assumed within his philosophical framework, without changing his view on faith as an unmediated paradox, as doubts as to the ethicalness of one's acts would not be obscured in the case of the man of faith as they would be in the case of the sinner but would be moved beyond by the person of faith without being purposefully obscured. This would hold true as the man of faith moves beyond the universal ethical for the ''telos behind it, as these doubts are necessary to the ethical life which one is moving beyond. This stands in contradiction to the sinner, who violates the ethical code without moving beyond it, and thus obscured the ethical doubts without moving beyond them. From this, I take it that the case for immorality of belief without sufficient evidence and the case for faith as an unmediated paradox are complementary. Having faith in certain beliefs without having sufficient evidence to back them up is immoral in the vast majority of cases; beliefs are never exclusively private matters, as previous generations have helped one form them and one will help for the next generation's, and for this reason one ought to avoid holding beliefs which might make society immoral. However, beliefs (and the actions based upon them) about whether or not the ethical cannot be consciously overridden for something higher than itself may be allowed without sufficient evidence, as sufficient evidence has not be produced that the ethical may not be suspended for a purpose higher than itself, and thus by definition it would be immoral to presume otherwise when we have the capacity not to. Most beliefs held without sufficient evidence are held through the obscuring of the doubts which come from the said lack of evidence, but I do not think that beyond-ethical beliefs fit into this class because they would be held without obscuring the doubts connected to them. Instead, these beyond-ethical beliefs would be held by moving beyond these doubts, through the evidence of the difference between unethical and beyond-ethical beliefs given by one's ability to allow doubts without dropping the belief. The very nature of ethics as a universally applicable code for life determines that this must necessarily be so, or otherwise a rational account of ethics would not be allowed to overcome its own loophole (which is absurd). In the Abrahamic paradigm (best exemplified in the historical personage of Jesus), the ethical consequences for a violating private action in some sense were the drive for the act, because every obscuration of his doubts about the beyond-ethical telos ''meant moving farther way from his private ethical relationship with God. The Abrahamic (or Jesusine) type would not willfully transgress the universal ethical code beyond what was needed to commit his beyond-ethical acts, as one would hold doubts about such un-teleological transgressions of the ethical because of the afore-mentioned nature of one's beyond-ethical beliefs. In the sinner's case, one merely exists in violation of the universal ethical code without being driven by the ethical consequences, as one's purpose behind committing one's unethical act did not necessarily require him to raise himself above the universal ethical code to be achieved. The sinner may willfully transgress the ethical code beyond what was needed to commit the unethical act taken without sufficient evidence (such as sincerely-believed obscuration of one's connection to the evil effects of such an action), as one already unrepentantly stands in un-teleological violation of the ethical code , and therefore may obscure one's doubts in the future and commit further unethical acts. In such a way, one may accumulate privately sufficient evidence for one's beliefs by examining one's actions to check whether they are in accordance with the higher purpose of the ethical or are simply being justified through one's private obscuration of one's doubts. A person of the Socratic paradigm, on the other hand, is simply the Abrahamic/Jesusine type at one remove, the ethical consequences for a violating private action in some sense being the the drive for behind their acts, because every obscuration of one's doubts about the need to presume without sufficient evidence that leading a self-examined life in "passionate pursuit of the truth and individual conscience" precludes the possibility of a beyond-ethical ''telos, ''would mean moving farther way from one's private ethical relationship with what one takes to be the logical nature of reality.The Socratic type would not willfully transgress the universal ethical code beyond what was needed to commit his beyond-ethical acts that consist of the rejection of the possibility of a beyond-ethical ''telos, as one would hold doubts about such un-teleological transgressions of the ethical because of the afore-mentioned nature of one's beyond-ethical beliefs. Either way, it ultimately becomes necessary to take a leap of faith on the question of whether ethics may be suspended for a beyond-ethical telos, and it is objectively indeterminable as to which manner of jumping is superior when applied in a universally consistent manner: Athens or Jersusalem - which is ultimately to say, Socrates or Jesus. The answers one gives to this question will always be supplied merely as a defense of the jump once having been made, and hence do not determine the direction. This understanding of beyond-ethical beliefs may be transferred to future generations indirectly through observing those who have acted upon their beyond-ethical beliefs, and drawing up assumptions which may be passed on to future generations, passing on the knowledge of the private difference between unethical and beyond-ethical acts in a public fashion. And in this way, the ability to hold private beyond-ethical beliefs may be passed on to future generations, enabling those generations to act closer to the higher purpose of the ethical code without unnecessarily violating it. Summarizing my conclusion, I believe that true religious faith is the purpose of the universal ethical code, and that believing in this purpose without apparently sufficient public evidence is not actually anti-ethical and is instead may be beyond-ethical according to private sufficient evidence, unlike immorally-held beliefs for which there is neither sufficient evidence for the general public or for one's self before self-deceit.